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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

MAINE ELECTION LAW: DO MAINE’S PETITION SIGNATURE
REQUIREMENTS DEPRIVE THIRD-PARTY CANDIDATES OF
EQUAL PROTECTION AND FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION
RIGHTS?

INTRODUCTION
Ballot access laws in the United States have drawn scrutiny in recent
years.1 All states in this country draft their own laws regarding ballot access
for state and federal office.2 Allowing states to write their own ballot rules has
become a contentious issue with some believing that discriminatory laws are
being used to keep third party candidates from having a legitimate chance at
gaining public office.3
The United States maintains a two party, winner-take-all system that serves
as a barrier to third party representation.4 The election system ensures that
representation will be almost exclusively limited to either Republicans or
Democrats, with independent candidates garnering seats only occasionally.5
Additionally, the laws of some states impose additional obstacles, making
elected office a nearly impossible accomplishment for third-party candidates.6
One feature of this system is that many people will never vote for a thirdparty candidate for fear that doing so would take votes from a more viable
candidate.7 Indeed, claims persist that the 2000 Presidential election would
have had a different outcome without third-party candidate Ralph Nader
1. See, e.g., RangeVoting.org, Ridiculous USA Ballot Access Laws Designed to
Discriminate Against Third Parties, http://rangevoting.org/BallAccess.html (last visited Feb. 15,
2010).
2. Id.
3. Id.; see also Richard Winger, Ballot Access Developments in 1994: Forward Steps
Outweigh Slips, http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/fsos94.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010)
[hereinafter Ballot Access Developments].
4. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1618
(1999).
5. Richard Winger, The Importance of Ballot Access, LONG TERM VIEW (2004) available at
http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/iba/html [hereinafter Importance of Ballot Access]; see
RangeVoting.org, supra note 1; United States Senate, Senators of the 111th Congress,
http://www.senate.gov/general/contact_information/senators_cfm.cfm (listing each United States
Senator and his or her political party).
6. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5; RangeVoting.org, supra note 1.
7. Reneé Steinhagen, Giving New Jersey’s Minor Political Parties a Chance: Permitting
Alternative Voting Systems in Local Elections, NEW JERSEY LAWYER, THE MAGAZINE, Aug.
2008, at 15–16.
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siphoning votes from Democratic candidate Vice President Al Gore.8 Be that
as it may, the possibility that third-party candidates may detract votes from a
major party candidate does not justify imposing separate election requirements.
This Note deals with the issue of restrictive ballot access laws imposed on
third party candidates in the State of Maine.9 The Maine Supreme Court has
dealt with third-party candidates in national elections improperly.10 Maine has
an interest in protecting the viability of its election process, yet cannot justify
its requirements that eliminate a candidate’s right to ballot access.11 Further,
this interest cannot be deemed compelling enough to disenfranchise people
who otherwise would have voted for an independent candidate.12
This Note argues that Maine’s ballot access requirements for third-party
candidates violate the candidate’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Part
I of this Note will discuss ballot access laws in general. The Note then
addresses a state’s power in managing its own elections, as well as the issue of
third-party candidates generally. The common understanding is that the
Constitution allows latitude to states in holding elections without outside
interference, though certain limitations may still be imposed on states. Part II
will then discuss the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in Knutson
v. Department of Secretary of State & Herbert Hoffman. Part III will examine
the history behind contentious ballot access laws in light of the argument that
such laws occasionally violate both the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Part IV will discuss the author’s analysis of the constitutionality of Maine
ballot access laws in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s past jurisprudence. The
Note concludes that Maine’s rigid requirements for candidates seeking a
position on a federal election ballot violate a third-party candidate’s rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution and that the
decision of the Hoffman Court was incorrect.

8. See Carmen Mosley-Sims, Note, Ballot Access Restrictions in Representative
Government: An Ode to the Wasted Vote, 26 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 703, 703 (2004).
9. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007); Virginia L. Woodell, Ogunquit’s Herb
Hoffman: Candidate for U.S., THE YORK INDEPENDENT, March 7, 2008, http://www.york
independent.net/news/2008/2008_03_07/080307_FTR_EC_og_senate. cfm.
10. See Emergency Application for a Stay of Enforcement of the Judgment of the Supreme
Judicial Court of Maine Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at
3, Herbert J. Hoffman v. John Knutson, 954 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Me. 2008) (arguing that Hoffman
demonstrated “fair prospect (indeed a likelihood) . . . [of] prevail[ing] on the merits [of his
claim]”) [hereinafter Knutson I].
11. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007) (enumerating requirements for
nomination petition); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (recognizing that some
state regulation is necessary to an orderly election process); Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State,
2008 ME 129, ¶¶ 10–11 (same) [hereinafter Knutson II].
12. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 806; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 18–
21.
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I. BALLOT ACCESS LAWS AND THIRD PARTY CANDIDATES
A.

Ballot Access Laws

Ballot access laws are written and enforced by individual states, and as
such, the laws of the various states differ with respect to independent party
candidates’ ballot access.13 While some states make ballot access for majorparty candidates quite easy, this is rarely the case for independent-party
candidates.14 Some have argued that of the world’s democracies, the United
States has the most unfair laws with respect to ballot access.15
Ballot laws affect third party congressional candidates differently than they
While third-party Presidential
do third-party Presidential candidates.16
candidates occasionally gain ballot spots, it is rare that independent candidates
gain ballot spots in congressional races.17 As a result of stringent American
ballot laws, it has been suggested that the United States is violating the
Copenhagen Meeting Document, requiring countries to: “Respect the right of
individuals to establish, in full freedom, their own political organizations and
provide such political parties and organizations with the necessary legal
guarantees to enable them to compete with each other on the basis of equal
treatment before the law and the authorities.”18
Attempts are being made to bridge the inequities existing between major
and minor-party candidates.19 For example, Georgia has introduced legislation
that would reduce signature requirements for independent candidates for the
13. Richard Winger, Ballot Access for Minor Candidates, BALLOT ACCESS NEWS (Ballot
Access News, San Francisco, Cal.), 1992, available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/case/3pt/
winger.html.
14. Id.; see also RangeVoting.org, supra note 1.
15. See, e.g., RangeVoting.org, supra note 1. For example, in Florida, “The ballot access
laws for third parties and independent candidates have been very severe since 1931. Since then
only two third-party candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives and only one for the U.S.
Senate have managed to get on the ballot.” Id. (emphasis removed). In addition, historic laws of
various states also show the general direction that ballot access laws have taken over the years.
Id. In Minnesota in 1961, petitions had to be finished in two weeks. Id. In West Virginia,
independent party candidates were required by law to inform people signing their petitions that if
they signed the petition of a third-party candidate, the voter would not be permitted to vote in a
primary. Id. To make matters worse, in West Virginia, the third-party candidate themselves
would never actually know whether or not they had enough signatures to be placed on a ballot,
because if anyone who signed the candidate’s petition was later found to have voted in a primary
election, the voter’s signature would be invalidated. Id.
16. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5.
17. Id. As a result of this discrepancy between third-party Presidential and congressional
candidates, and because independent Presidential candidates more frequently get ballot access,
Winger says that the public may not believe that there is a problem for ballot access for
independent candidates. Id.
18. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
19. Id.
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House of Representatives to 5000. The law previously required 14,000.20
Similar attempts have been made in Illinois, where proposed legislation would
reduce the number of third-party signatures required by 11,000.21
B.

Third-Party Candidates

A common perception in the United States is that third-party candidates are
often unelectable. Perhaps to ameliorate concerns that their ballot laws impose
systemic burdens on third-party candidates, a number of states have taken a
closer look at their ballot access laws for third party candidates, with some
improvements being made since the early 1990s.22 Since the 1930s, third
parties in the United States have rarely received enough votes for viable
candidacies, despite the fact that many voters now identify themselves as
unaffiliated with either of the major political parties.23 The plurality voting
system has certainly played a role in the lack of viable third-party candidates
since winning a percentage of the vote does not guarantee legislative
representation.24 State ballot laws also reduce the viability of third party
candidates by imposing additional restrictions or requirements.25 While it is
possible for third party candidates to run successful campaigns, certain states
have acknowledged the restrictive nature of their laws and have sought to
amend them accordingly.26
Concerns about Maine ballot access laws arose in the past year. During
the 2008 United States Senate race in Maine, Herbert Hoffman ran as an
independent candidate for the Senate seat held by Senator Susan Collins.27
Despite the fact that Hoffman believed that he had obtained the required
number of petition signatures for his candidacy, Hoffman was left off the ballot
due to a court ruling that a number of petition signatures were improperly
obtained.28
II. THE HOFFMAN CASE
Ballot-access laws in Maine for third-party political candidates are
designed to protect the integrity of the political process and to ensure that
20. Id.
21. Importance of Ballot Access, supra note 5.
22. Ballot Access Developments, supra note 3.
23. Steinhagen, supra note 7, at 15–16.
24. See id. at 15 (noting that people prefer to vote for a candidate whom they perceive as
electable).
25. Pildes, supra note 4, at 1617.
26. Id. at 1617–18 (noting that Jesse Ventura, who won the gubernatorial race in Minnesota,
was able to win election as a third-party candidate); see also Winger, supra note 3 (describing
changes to state election laws in 1994).
27. Woodell, supra note 9.
28. Knutson I, 954 A.2d 1054, 1057–62 (2008).
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candidates go through proper measures to obtain ballot access.29 The specific
language of Maine Revised Statutes tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) states:
The circulator of a nomination petition shall verify by oath or affirmation
before a notary public or other person authorized by law to administer oaths or
affirmations that all of the signatures to the petition were made in the
circulator’s presence and that to the best of the circulator’s knowledge and
belief each signature is the signature of the person whose name it purports to
be; each signature authorized under section 153-A was made by the authorized
signer in the presence and at the direction of the voter; and each person is a
30
resident of the electoral division named in the petition.

The plain language of the statute indicates that to validly obtain a petition
signature from a voter, the candidate must be in the voter’s immediate presence
while the petition is signed.31
Herbert Hoffman ran for the United States Senate in Maine during the
2008 election.32 The law in Maine required Hoffman, as a non-party
candidate, to collect signatures on petitions that were to be presented to the
Secretary of State.33 Hoffman did not obtain all of the signatures alone; about
forty people assisted.34 By law, Hoffman—as well as those who were
collecting signatures for him—needed to swear oaths as circulators.35
Hoffman’s daughter, in addition to other circulators, also helped with obtaining
signatures, specifically on election petitions that Hoffman had taken personal
care to distribute, with Hoffman failing to observe some of the signatures, as
was required by law.36 Despite the fact that Hoffman met the requirements
regarding the number of signatures presented to the Secretary of State, the
issue litigated in Hoffman was whether those signatures were lawfully and
properly obtained.37
The main issue concerning the signatures was whether Maine law required
that the petitions be signed within the personal view of the petition circulator.38
The Secretary of State determined that the law required the circulator of the
petition to attest that the circulator was both physically present and aware of

29. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62
(holding that absence of fraudulent intent is not a defense to failure to comply with ballot access
law).
30. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007).
31. See id. (imposing duty of knowledge on petition circulator).
32. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1056–57.
33. Id. at 1057; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(5)(C) (2007).
34. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1057.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1057–58.
37. Id. at 1057 (noting that over 4000 signatures were obtained by Hoffman for presentation
to the Secretary).
38. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A).
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the signing when the third-party’s petition was signed.39 The circulator had to
have sufficient physical proximity to witness the actual signing of the
petition.40
John Knutson, the Chairman of the Maine Democratic Party, contended
that because Hoffman did not witness three of the signatures, he violated
Maine election law.41 The issue becomes one of technicalities, because the
allegation from Knutson was not that Hoffman was not near the petition when
it was signed by a number of voters, but that because Hoffman did not see the
signing of the petition, those signatures should be void.42 Knutson argued that
under Maine law, not only should the three improperly obtained signatures be
rendered void, but the entire petition on which the signatures appeared should
also have been voided.43
Both the trial court and the Secretary of State disagreed.44 The Secretary
of State determined that of the 4112 signatures presented by Hoffman, seventyfour ought to be invalidated, leaving Hoffman with enough signatures for a
place on the ballot.45 Knutson challenged the decision of the Secretary of
State, appealing to the Superior Court.46 The decision was appealed, as the
court noted:
pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 80B and 21-A M.R.S. § 356(2)(D) (2007), urging the
court to conclude that Hoffman’s oath was not in compliance with section
354(7)(A) because Hoffman could not accurately aver that the three signatures
had been provided in his presence as required by 21–A M.R.S. § 354(7)(A),
47
and, therefore, that each of the three petitions must be declared void.

If the petitions were voided in their entirety, Hoffman would not have enough
signatures for a place on the ballot.48
Hoffman and the Secretary of State set forth three arguments on appeal.49
The first argument by the Secretary of State alleged that to invalidate all of the
signatures on the questioned petitions would be unconstitutional.50 If all of the

39. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1059.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 1056 (presenting the questions raised by Knutson’s claims); Emergency
Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2.
42. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1057 (noting that with the invalidation of seventy-four signatures,
Hoffman would still have been left with 4038 signatures, which would still be enough for a place
on the ballot).
46. Id. at 1057–58.
47. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 356(2)(D) (2007).
48. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1058.
49. Id. at 1061–62.
50. Id. at 1061.
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petition signatures were void, the Secretary claimed, the freedom of
association rights of the remaining voters would be infringed.51
A second challenge, raised both by Hoffman and the Secretary of State,
was that the only requirement of § 354(7) is that there be an honest oath, and
though an oath may not have been accurately taken, as long as it was honestly
taken, the oath should be upheld.52 The third claim by the Secretary of State
was that petitions should only be invalidated in their entirety where the
“defect” in the oath of the circulator was so great that it undermined the
process of signature gathering.53
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court addressed the three arguments raised
by Hoffman and the Secretary of State.54 For the first argument, the court
reasoned that because Maine jurisprudence allowed for the invalidation of the
petitions in their entirety, the result was acceptable.55 The court came to this
conclusion without any consideration of the constitutional issue that Hoffman
raised.56 With regard to the second issue, the court rejected Hoffman’s
rationale that as long as an honest oath was taken, it should be upheld.57 The
court reasoned that the language of the statute itself did not allow for this type
of interpretation and sought to impose the literal interpretation of the statute to
safeguard the validity of the nomination process.58 Thus, while Hoffman
argued that fraud should be required for the complete invalidation of a petition,
and while the court acknowledged that fraud is a means by which a petition
will be invalidated, fraud is not a precondition to invalidation.59 With regard to
Hoffman’s final claim, the court was unmoved by the argument that the defect
in the oath had to undermine the process of signature gathering; instead, the
court retreated to the plain language of the statute, noting that the legislature
could have opted to interpret the statute in a manner consistent with the desired
interpretation of the Secretary.60 The court reasoned that although the
Secretary’s policy rationale was not irrational, the legislature never intended to
use such reasoning, and as such, the plain language of the law should be
used.61
When the Maine Supreme Judicial Court began its analysis, it first noted
that the standard of review it would use when acting within its “appellate

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 354(7) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061.
Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1062.
Id. at 1061–62.
Id. at 1061.
Id.
Id. at 1061–62.
Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061.
Id. at 1061–62.
Id. at 1062.
Id.
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capacity” was “for findings not supported by the evidence, errors of law, or
abuse of discretion.”62 The court looked to determine the intent of the
legislature at the time that the legislation was written, looking first to the “plain
language of the statute.”63 Should the language of the statute be deemed
ambiguous, and the decision rendered by the Secretary of State reasonable, the
court would defer to the interpretation of the Secretary of State.64
The issue in this case was whether the Secretary’s interpretation of what
constitutes being in the presence of a circulator of a petition was a reasonable
interpretation of the statute.65 One of the turning points in the discussion
regarded whether general “proximity” to the circulated petitions sufficed to be
considered “in the circulator’s presence,” or whether a more direct physical
presence was necessary.66 The Secretary of State recognized that if the
circulator of the petition could not actually witness the signing of the petition,
then the requirement that the signature be given in the circulator’s presence
could not be met.67 Thus, the court recognized that the Secretary correctly
determined that being in the circulator’s presence meant being “under direct
observation of that circulator.”68
The next issue was what remedy ought to be employed with regard to the
improperly obtained signatures.69 The court reasoned that the oath Hoffman
had taken alleging compliance with petitioning requirements was improper
because some signatures had been obtained while Hoffman was not present.70
While the court noted that three specific signatures had been collected
improperly, Hoffman later admitted that:
(1) there were times when he used the assistance of another person to collect
the signatures for which he was the circulator; (2) his daughter used a separate
clipboard to collect signatures when he was the circulator; (3) he thought that
being within ten or fifteen feet of his non-circulator ‘assistant’ was acceptable;
(4) another individual gathered a few signatures while he, Hoffman, was
engaged in dealing with other responsibilities; and (5) he ‘might have’ left his
daughter alone for a brief period to collect signatures while he was otherwise
71
engaged.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 1058 (citing Palesky v. Sec’y of State, 711 A.2d 129, 132 (Me. 1998).
Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1058.
Id.
Id. at 1059.
Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1059.
Id. at 1059–60.
Id.
Id. at 1059.
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As a result, the court concluded that it was not possible for Hoffman to have
taken a legitimate oath.72 Because only three such instances of improper
petition signing could be identified, however, the Secretary of State believed
that only those three signatures could be invalidated.73 In prior hearings
regarding petition circulation, the Secretary of State believed that the only time
that a petition in its entirety ought to be thrown out is when the problem in the
petition “undercuts the veracity of the oath as applied to the entire petition.”74
But the Maine Supreme Judicial Court also looked at the plain language of
the law regarding nominating petitions.75 Maine law provides that “[a]
nomination petition which does not meet the requirements of this section is
void. If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or
printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted,
but the petition is otherwise valid.”76 Further, because the court reasoned that
no requirement of fraud was necessary for the invalidation of a petition, it
noted that the application of the law was straightforward.77 As such, the court
held that unless an exception to Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21-A § 354(9) applied,
the petitions had to be invalidated in their entirety.78 Neither of the parties to
the action argued that the exceptions to § 354(9) applied under the
circumstances.79
During subsequent challenges by Hoffman in a Motion for Stay at the
Maine Supreme Court, Hoffman argued that those voters who had legitimately
signed his petition should not be deprived of their voting rights.80 The Maine
Supreme Judicial Court concluded that prior holdings of the U.S. Supreme
Court show that states have flexibility in ensuring the integrity of their
elections.81 The Maine Supreme Judicial Court also reasoned that the petition

72. Id. at 1059–60.
73. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060.
74. Id. at 1060 (citation omitted).
75. Id.
76. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 354(9) (2007); see also Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060
(explaining that the language of the statute seems straightforward, and that the test is almost black
and white in nature; if the requirements of the statute are met, the petition may be used, but if the
requirements are not met, the petition must be voided).
77. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060.
78. Id. at 1060–61.
79. Id. at 1061.
80. Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State & Herbert Hoffman, Docket No. Ken-08-375, 2008
WL 3855025, *2 (Me. 2008) [hereinafter Knutson III]. Hoffman argued that “his mistake should
not affect the voters who signed his petition; specifically, he questions whether the application of
section 354(7)(A) and (9), as first explicitly interpreted by ‘any court or agency on July 28,
[2008],’ violates the First Amendment rights of Maine voters.” Id. (emphasis removed).
81. Id. (citing Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 191 (1999)).
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requirements applied to all candidates, and that they did not affect any
candidates differently than others—a point which is refutable.82
In an Emergency Application for Stay to the U.S. Supreme Court,
Hoffman analyzed the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court in
determining whether the decision of the court had been in error, and whether
an emergency stay should be granted.83 Hoffman argued that the decision of
the Maine Supreme Court subjected both voters in the State of Maine, as well
as Hoffman himself, to “irreparable injury.”84 Hoffman reasoned that as a
result of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision ridding Hoffman of
approximately ninety signatures on three petitions, Maine voters would no
longer have the opportunity to vote for the candidate of their choice in the
general election in November 2008.85 Hoffman noted that the work of the
Maine Supreme Court, as well as the evidentiary support in its decision, lacked
sufficient merit in addressing the issue of First Amendment rights.86
Specifically, Hoffman’s rationale was that the Secretary of State (the
individual responsible for the enforcement of election law) believed that the
invalidation of the petitions in their entirety would impose improper burdens
on First Amendment rights,87 and that the decision of the Maine Supreme
Court runs counter to recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions and other federal
circuit decisions that have applied strict scrutiny under circumstances where
election rights have been improperly burdened.88
While Maine law required that the circulator of a petition have the petition
signed in his or her presence, the definition of “presence” is not actually
included within the statute itself, subjecting the law to interpretation.89
Individuals who signed Hoffman’s petition while outside of his presence
acknowledged that they were outside of Hoffman’s presence at the time they
signed the petitions.90 The issue, however, is ambiguous, as the Maine
Superior Court believed that the Secretary of State came to a reasonable
conclusion when he determined that the requirements of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann.
tit. 21-A § 354(9) showed that a petition did not need to be invalidated in its
entirety simply because all signatures on the petition were improper.91 Of
82. Id. at *2–3.
83. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2–3.
86. Id. at 3 (“It decided the weighty First Amendment issues at stake with a few conclusory
sentences, two case citations, and a declaration that it need ‘not address the constitutional concern
further.’”). See id.
87. Id.
88. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3.
89. Id. at 6–9; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); see also ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9) (2007).
90. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 7–8.
91. Id. at 9–10; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9) (2007).
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course, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court did not agree with the decision, and
believed that the petitions needed to be completely invalidated if an invalid
signature was present.92 The Secretary of State asserted to the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court that “[a] regulation that significantly burdens First Amendment
rights must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”93 Further, the Secretary of State
reasoned that if the interpretation of the Maine Supreme Court was upheld,
there was a serious risk that voters, who had been qualified to sign the petition
and had done so, would have their rights seriously infringed.94 Specifically,
the Secretary of State said:
To require voiding of all of the voters’ signatures on a petition form based on a
later finding that the oath was factually incorrect (or based on a
misinterpretation of law) with regard to only one signature on that form, would
deprive the voters who signed the petition of their rights to associate with, and
vote for, the candidate in question. In the absence of any evidence of fraud or
misconduct on the part of the candidate or circulator, reading the statute this
way imposes a draconian remedy that is not narrowly tailored to serving an
95
important governmental interest.

The argument posed by the Secretary of State was that no sufficient
government interest was being served, though the rights of voters to have their
votes counted was being infringed upon.96
Hoffman next asserted that, based on the foregoing arguments, his First
Amendment rights would be violated insofar as he would not be allowed to
appear on the November 2008 election ballot as a candidate for the Senate.97
He argued that merely being able to appear as a write-in candidate would not
be sufficient to remedy the violation.98 Further, the injury was immediate, and
four years would pass before there was another Senate race in Maine.99
With regard to voters, past decisions had addressed potential injury similar
to that in the present case.100 Quoting the Supreme Court in Anderson v.
Celebreeze, Hoffman argued, “The right to vote is ‘heavily burdened’ if that
vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other parties
or other candidates are ‘clamoring for a place on the ballot.’”101 Hoffman

92. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 10–11.
93. Id. at 12.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12–13.
97. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14; see also Fowler v. Adams, 400
U.S. 1205, 1206 (1970).
98. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–15.
99. Id. at 15; see also Campbell v. Bennett, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1347 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
100. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 15.
101. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1982)).
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continued his analysis by making note of the fact that in New England, the
chances of having an independent candidate elected to the position of United
States Senator are good.102 Hoffman said that the only realistic way for an
independent candidate to be elected in Maine would be to ensure that
Hoffman’s name was placed on the ballot.103 Further, Hoffman rationalized
the importance of the right to vote, noting that prior cases have held “No right
is more precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of
those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.”104 Any
violation of First Amendment rights is unacceptable, and the injury in this case
could not be remedied in any manner.105 “The loss of First Amendment
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes
irreparable injury.”106
The Supreme Court has held that the process of getting signatures for a
petition constitutes protected speech.107 Specifically, the “Court has held that
‘the solicitation of signatures for a petition involves protected speech since it
‘involves both the expression of a desire for political change and a discussion
of the merits of the proposed change.’”108 The circulation of petitions for
elections constitutes political speech because it is an interaction between
people looking to formulate “political change.”109 As such, Hoffman
concluded that Maine election law, especially in the manner in which it was
applied in the Hoffman case, constitutes an improper burden on the voters of
Maine, as well as third party candidates who are seeking a place on the
ballot.110
III. HISTORY
A.

Early Developments in Ballot Access Initiatives

At the end of the nineteenth century, ballot access laws were not designed
to infringe on the rights of potential political candidates.111 The general public
did not believe that ballot laws were to act as a restrictive wall to a candidate

102. Id. at 15–16 (noting that recently, two Senators from New England states have been
independents).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 16 (quoting Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964)).
105. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 16.
106. Id. (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)).
107. Id. at 16–17.
108. Id. at 17 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 421–22 n.5 (1988)).
109. Id. (quoting Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 186
(1999)).
110. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 15–18.
111. Bradley A. Smith, Note, Judicial Protection of Ballet Access Rights: Third Parties Need
Not Apply, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 167, 173 (1991).
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or his or her party.112 During this era, two signatures on an election petition
would have been enough for a potential candidate to have his name placed on a
ballot.113 Today, American voters do not have the choices that prior
generations did.114
During the First World War, the laws began to change regarding ballot
access.115 During the 1940s, ballot laws continued to take aim at minor-party
candidates in light of the Communist scare that was disquieting the American
psyche.116 This, in turn, increased the number of signatures required on
petitions for nominating third-party candidates.117
B.

How States Restrict Ballot Access

In the past, states developed a number of measures to restrict minor-party
candidates from access to ballots.118 One manner in which candidates have
been restricted from ballots is through the use of petition requirements, where a
certain number of signatures need to be collected by a potential candidate
before his or her name will appear on the ballot.119 All states, with the
exception of Mississippi, have at some time or another required some sort of
signature collection.120 The laws themselves impose requirements on thirdparty candidates that are not usually imposed on major-party candidates.121
Major parties often have perpetual places on ballots, which is something that
minor-party candidates have not yet been granted.122 Only when a party
obtains a certain percentage of the vote from a previous election will they be
guaranteed a spot on subsequent ballots.123 For example, in 1891, under Ohio
law, this meant that independent candidates were required to have their
petitions signed by a minimum of one percent of the vote cast for governor
during the last gubernatorial election.124 While obtaining the percentage is not
a difficult task for major-party candidates, for a third-party candidate, this
112. Id. at 173 n.3.
113. Id.
114. Richard Winger, What are Ballots For?, LIBERTARIAN PARTY NEWS, 1988,
http://www.ballot-access.org/winger/wabf.html.
115. Smith, supra note 111, at 173–74.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 174.
118. Id. at 174–75; Richard Winger, Ballot Format: Must Candidates be Treated Equally?, 45
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 87, 87, 100 (1997) [hereinafter Ballot Format].
119. Smith, supra note 111, at 175.
120. Id.; see also Ballot Format, supra note 118, at 88 (noting that Ohio has required petitions
for third-party candidates since 1891, though at that time, only 500 signatures were required to
get on the election ballot).
121. Smith, supra note 111, at 174–76.
122. Id. at 175.
123. Id.
124. Ballot Format, supra note 118, at 88.
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requirement is not often met.125 Though the issue of ballot access laws
continues to be contentious, it has not merely developed within the past couple
of years.126
C. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Ballot Access Laws
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of ballot access
laws on many occasions, leading to conclusions that often served to protect the
interests of third-party candidates.127 One of the foremost cases involving
ballot access among third-party candidates was Williams v. Rhodes.128 In
Williams, the Supreme Court examined whether the Ohio election statutes
made it too difficult for third-party candidates to obtain a place on a general
election ballot.129 The Socialist Party of Ohio challenged Ohio’s laws as
unconstitutional.130 The Socialist party had been able to maintain a spot on
Ohio’s election ballots up until 1948, when the party acknowledged that it
would not be able to file a petition with the required number of signatures.131
The panel that examined the case in 1948 noted that the Socialist Party
would be allowed to have a write-in candidate on the ballot, though an actual
place on the ballot would not be allocated to the party.132 By 1968, supporters
of George Wallace had formed an independent political party in Ohio, and
launched a campaign lasting six months so that the required number of
signatures could be collected.133 Eventually, their party was able to collect
over 450,000 signatures for its petition, which exceeded the 433,100
required.134 There was never an issue that the party failed to obtain the
requisite number of signatures for appearance on the ballot.135 Rather, the
controversy surrounded the time allocated for filing.136 The party challenged
the validity of such early filing deadlines, alleging that such requirements

125. Smith, supra note 111, at 175.
126. See id. at 174–78.
127. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 784–86 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes,
393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968).
128. 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (examining Ohio election statutes to determine whether the
provisions makes it excessively difficult for third-party candidates to obtain a place on a general
election ballot).
129. Id. at 31.
130. Id. at 26.
131. Id. at 26–27; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 178 (discussing the Ohio American
Independent Party, the other party in the Williams case).
132. Williams, 393 U.S. at 28.
133. Smith, supra note 111, at 178; see also Williams, 393 U.S. at 26–27 (“The Ohio
American Independent Party was formed in January 1968 by Ohio partisans of former Governor
George C. Wallace of Alabama.”).
134. Williams, 393 U.S. at 26.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id.; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 178.
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served as a detriment to Ohio voters, and denied independent Ohio voters of
equal protection rights.137
The Supreme Court noted that Ohio was unable to dictate any compelling
reason for imposing such enormous burdens on minor parties with respect to a
citizen’s “right to vote and . . . to associate.”138 Ohio claimed that such
stringent requirements on third parties promoted stability in the political
system.139 But the Court believed that what Ohio was doing was promoting
complete control of the political system within the Democratic and Republican
parties.140 In addition, because third parties had to file at such an early date to
obtain the necessary number of signatures to receive a place on the ballot, there
were potential hindrances to a minor party’s ability to form quickly enough to
meet the requirements that had been established by the state.141 As a result, the
Supreme Court held that Ohio’s ballot access laws were unconstitutional due to
their overly restrictive nature, and the Ohio American Independent Party was
allowed to have a spot on the general election ballot.142
1.

Jenness v. Fortson

Three years later, the Court had the opportunity to revisit its holding in
Williams, responding to a challenge to Georgia’s ballot access laws.143 The
Court’s first task was to determine what constituted a political party under
Georgia law.144 Georgia law provided that a political party was “any political
organization whose candidate received 20% or more of the vote at the most
recent gubernatorial or presidential election.”145 All other political groups
were “political bod[ies],” meaning that certain requirements would be imposed
on that group if it wanted to have a place on a subsequent election ballot.146
For political bodies, candidates seeking a spot on a general election ballot for
the office of president or governor would be forced to acquire votes from five
percent of the voting population that was otherwise “eligible to vote in the last
election for the filling of the office he is seeking . . . .”147 Petitions could be
137. Williams, 393 U.S. at 27.
138. Id. at 31.
139. Id. at 31–32.
140. Id. at 32; see also Smith, supra note 111, at 179.
141. Williams, 393 U.S. at 33 (showing that by having such restrictive requirements, Ohio
voters were deprived of a choice both regarding who they want to have in office, in addition to
being denied the opportunity to have certain issues addressed).
142. Smith, supra note 111, at 180.
143. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439–41 (1971).
144. Id. at 433.
145. Id. (noting a distinction between what constitutes a “political party” and what could be
referred to as a “political body”).
146. Id.
147. Id. (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1010(b)); see also Amber J. Juffer, Note, Living in a
Party World: Respecting the Role of Third Party and Independent Candidates in the Equal
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circulated for 180 days, and the timing standards were identical to those
provisions for primary candidates associated with political parties.148
The challengers’ first argument with respect to the Georgia law was that a
requirement that imposes an obligation on an independent candidate “to secure
the signatures of a certain number of voters before his name may be printed on
the ballot is to abridge the freedoms of speech and association guaranteed to
that candidate and his supporters by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.”149
The second argument set forth by the challengers was that the nomination
process for non-party candidates violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution insofar as there were different standards for the
major-party candidates and the independent candidates.150
The Supreme Court considered the case in light of its findings in Williams
v. Rhodes.151 The Court noted that the statutory procedures present in Williams
made it nearly impossible for minor political parties to receive a place on a
general election ballot.152 The Court in Williams held that Ohio law imposed a
large number of requirements on independent party candidates, forcing
“extensive organization” that was not also required of major party
candidates.153 As such, Justice Douglas believed that Ohio had restricted its
candidates to Democrats and Republicans.154 The Court distinguished
Williams from Jenness, noting that under Georgia law, those candidates who
were unable to secure a place on the ballot could still launch a write-in
campaign.155 Unlike the Ohio law at issue in Williams, Georgia law did not
contain confusing and complicated rules for new parties.156 The Court’s
decision in Jenness ultimately stood on the ground that “Georgia’s election
laws, unlike Ohio’s, do not operate to freeze the political status quo.”157
The problems that arose following Jenness included the Supreme Court’s
difficulty in using a single standard of review when examining issues of equal
protection among independent political candidates.158 The Court used multiple
standards of review for equal protection, and would sometimes apply strict
Protection Analysis of Ballot Access Cases, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 217, 222–23 (2007) (noting that
the petition “had to be signed by five percent of the total number of the previous election’s
eligible voters”).
148. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 433–44.
149. Id. at 434.
150. Id.
151. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 434–37 (examining Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968)).
152. Id. at 438.
153. Id. (quoting Williams, 393 U.S. at 27).
154. Id. at 436.
155. Id. at 438 (explaining that independent candidates were allowed to run a campaign,
whereas under Ohio law write-in voting for independent candidates was not permitted).
156. Jenness, 403 U.S. at 438.
157. Id.; see also Juffer, supra note 147, at 222–23.
158. Juffer, supra note 147, at 222–24.
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scrutiny, while other times it would apply intermediate scrutiny to evaluate
whether a candidate had been denied equal protection rights.159 When the
Supreme Court finally decided Anderson v. Celebrezze, a more objective basis
was established for determining whether a state’s actions with regard to ballot
access had violated the rights of an independent, non-party candidate.160
2.

Balancing Test of Anderson

The Supreme Court’s analysis of Anderson v. Celebrezze established a
balancing test to determine whether or not an individual’s right to placement
on an election ballot had been violated.161 John Anderson initally ran for the
office of President as a Republican, but later opted to run as an independent
instead, realizing that he would be unlikely to defeat Ronald Reagan in the
Republican primary.162 Anderson announced his candidacy as an independent
candidate for President on April 24, 1980, and shortly after, his political
supporters began to gather the signatures necessary to place him on the
ballot.163 If Anderson filed the required number of signatures as well as the
appropriate documents stating that he intended to run for President of the
United States as a major party candidate, there would have been no problem
getting a spot on the November ballot.164 As an independent candidate,
however, Anderson was denied what would have otherwise been a certain spot
in the general election.165 By the time Anderson officially announced his

159. Id. at 225–26 (“In Norman v. Reed, the Court added that a severe burden on an
independent or third-party candidate triggers strict scrutiny. However, the Court has been
reluctant to find any burden that is severe enough to justify using strict scrutiny analysis.”).
160. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
161. Donald E. Daybell, Guarding the Treehouse: Are States “Qualified” to Restrict Ballot
Access in Federal Elections?, 80 B.U. L. REV. 289, 309–10 (2000) (summarizing Anderson).
162. See also Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782, 788–89 (challenging an Ohio law under which
major political party candidates and minor political-party candidates were distinguished when
considering the timing of when they were forced to turn in petitions for a position in the general
election); Daybell, supra note 161, at 308–09.
163. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 782 (noting that Anderson was seeking to have his name placed
on the general election ballot for every state, in addition to having his name placed on the ballot
in Washington, D.C.).
164. Id. at 782–83 (“These documents would have entitled Anderson to a place on the ballot
if they had been filed before [the deadline]. Respondent refused to accept the petition solely
because it had not been filed within the time required by § 3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised
Code.”).
165. Id. at 782–83. Section 3513.25.7 of the Ohio Revised Code read:
Each person desiring to become an independent candidate for an office for which
candidates may be nominated at a primary election . . . shall file no later than four p.m. of
the seventy-fifth day before the day of the primary election immediately preceding the
general election at which such candidacy is to be voted for by the voters, a statement of
candidacy and nominating petition as provided in section 3513.261 . . . of the Revised
Code . . . .
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candidacy as an independent, the deadline for filing under Ohio law for
independent political candidates had already passed.166
The District Court determined that there were two grounds for finding the
Ohio law improper.167 First, the early filing deadline for independent party
candidates was deemed unconstitutional because “[i]t imposed an
impermissible burden on the First Amendment rights of Anderson and his Ohio
supporters and diluted the potential value of votes that might be cast for him in
other States.”168 Further, the District Court also noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment was violated insofar as Ohio’s election laws mandated action on
the part of non-party candidates, while not enforcing similar provisions against
members seeking office who belonged to a political party.169 In addition, the
District Court rejected the State of Ohio’s justifications for the law—
administrative convenience and “political stability”—because those interests
were of “diminished importance in a Presidential campaign,” and because
those concerns were adequately addressed by another Ohio statute.170
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the early filing deadline for
non-party candidates was important, allowing voters the opportunity to analyze
their independent candidate choices.171 But Anderson challenged not only the
filing provisions under Ohio law, he also wanted his name placed on the ballot
in states like Maryland and Maine, where earlier filing deadlines were also
used.172
The Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that it was concerned that
heavy restrictions on voters’ rights would have an impact on the number of
candidates that a prospective voter could choose from.173 The Court found that
a number of freedoms were potentially infringed by the requirements of Ohio’s
early filing date.174 The first was the general belief of voters that they will

Id. at 783 n.1.
166. Id. at 782.
167. Id. at 783.
168. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 309–11 (summarizing
Anderson).
169. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783.
170. Id. at 783–84.
171. Id. at 784–86.
172. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (citing Anderson v. Quinn, 634 F.2d 616 (1st Cir. 1980);
Anderson v. Morris, 636 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1980), each of which upheld district court decisions
ordering Anderson’s name placed on the ballot); see generally Anderson v. Morris, 500 F.Supp.
1095 (Md. 1980) (noting that the order of the Maryland court was also for affirmance); see
generally Anderson v. Quinn, 495 F.Supp. 730 (Me. 1980) (explaining that the order of
affirmance was issued).
173. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (explaining that the Court must look at how the voter is
impacted by the laws).
174. Id. at 786–88.
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have a candidate choice representing their own thoughts or values on issues.175
The Court reasoned that if only major-party candidates made the ballot while
third-party candidates were excluded, the rights of the voter would be
burdened.176 Second, denying certain candidates a place on the ballot also has
implications for the freedom of association rights of voters, and the Court
noted that elections play an important role in allowing people with similar
ideals and values to come together in support of a candidate for political
office.177
Generally, states were allowed to enact certain restrictions on political
candidates when those restrictions were essential to the operation of elections,
or where there were other reasons for imposing those restrictions.178 The
Anderson Court stated that “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.”179 In
determining whether a state’s actions were legitimate with regard to the
restrictions imposed on non-party candidates, the Court established a balancing
test.180 First, the Court needed to “consider the character and magnitude of the
asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate.”181 Second, the Court needed to “identify
and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for
the burden imposed by its rule.”182 Finally, the Court had to “consider the
extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s
rights.”183 Once the Court considered those three factors, it could determine
whether or not the challenged provision violated the constitution.184
The Supreme Court noted that Ohio election law served as a serious
detriment to the political process in Ohio because it required that independent

175. See id. at 787; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
176. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88 (quoting Lubin, 415 U.S. at 716) (“The right to vote is
‘heavily burdened’ if that vote may be cast only for major-party candidates at a time when other
parties or other candidates are ‘clamoring for a place on the ballot.’”).
177. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–88.
178. Id. at 788; Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
179. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730).
180. Id. at 789; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310 (summarizing Anderson).
181. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310 (summarizing
Anderson).
182. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Ryan Nazzarine, A Faceless Name in the Crowd:
Freedom of Association, Equal Protection, and Discriminatory Ballot Access Laws, 72 U. CIN. L.
REV. 309, 319 (2003) (characterizing the Anderson Court’s holding as concluding “that the
burden placed upon voters unquestionably outweighed the State’s interests”).
183. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
184. Id.
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candidates file their petition forms at too early a date.185 While major parties
had a long period of time and added flexibility in choosing their presidential
nominees, independent candidates were compelled to decide whether they
were going to run by March.186 The Ohio law was also deemed to hinder an
independent party candidate’s ability to collect the required number of
signatures.187 The Court ultimately held that the early deadline for filing
imposed a heavy burden on Ohio’s “independent-minded voters.”188 The
major question for the Court in determining the constitutionality of such
provisions was whether “the availability of political opportunity” was “unfairly
or unnecessarily burden[ed]” by the restrictions imposed by the state.189 The
Court held that where a burden falls upon an independent candidate in a
manner that is not equal to that of a major party candidate, association rights
protected by the First Amendment are infringed.190
3.

The Battle over the Constitutionality of Term Constraints on Ballot
Laws

Term constraints have been looked at as an improper ballot restriction as
well.191 When a candidate for office has been disqualified, the Court has
sought to determine whether the decision can be upheld using the rationale that
the candidate was unable to obtain a certain level of public support prior to the
election.192 For instance, Arkansas law prohibited individuals who had already
served three terms in the United States House of Representatives from running
for that position again.193 When the law was challenged in U.S. Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, the Court identified two issues: first, “whether the
Constitution forbids States to add to or alter the qualifications specifically
185. Id. at 790–91 (noting that independent candidates were forced to have their petitions
filed in March; major party candidates often had not even been nominated by that time, nor would
they be for a significant period).
186. Id. at 791 n.11 (“Indeed, because it takes time for an independent Presidential candidate
and his supporters to gather the requisite 5,000 signatures on nominating petitions, the
independent must decide to run well in advance of the March filing deadline. In contrast, Ohio
law provides for the automatic inclusion of the Presidential nominees of the major parties on the
general election ballot, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.10 (Supp. 1982), even if they have never
filed a statement of candidacy in Ohio. Their identities are not established until after the majorparty conventions in August.”).
187. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 792 (stating that when the date for filing is imposed on such an
early date as it pertains to independent candidates, it makes things more difficult for that
candidate in terms of organizing his or her campaign; such difficulties includes finding
volunteers, and finding people who are willing to contribute to an independent campaign).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 793 (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982)).
190. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94.
191. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 827 (1995).
192. Daybell, supra note 161, at 320.
193. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 784.
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enumerated in the Constitution;”194 second, “if the Constitution does so forbid,
whether the fact that Amendment 73 [the Arkansas law at issue] is formulated
as a ballot access restriction rather than as an outright disqualification is of
constitutional significance.”195 The Court noted that, despite the fact that
candidates still had a right to pursue their candidacy through a write-in
campaign, the State of Arkansas had acted in a manner contrary to the United
States Constitution.196
One issue in Thornton was that of public support, and whether a state’s
decision to disqualify a candidate for office can stand if the candidate fails to
show that he or she has obtained a certain level of public support prior to an
election.197 The Court noted that the petitioners in an earlier case, Storer,
unsuccessfully argued that the signature requirements placed on independent
candidates imposed an additional qualification on running for office, violating
the Qualifications Clause.198 The Thornton Court distinguished Storer with
little explanation, stating only that Storer did not apply on the present facts.199
4.

First Amendment Protections

The First Amendment plays an integral role in protecting the political
process, and the Supreme Court has acknowledged the fundamental
importance of the amendment’s protection in the political sphere.200
Specifically, the First Amendment plays a fundamental role with regard to
ballot access laws and ensures that strict scrutiny is used when addressing such
issues.201 One of the major purposes of the First Amendment is to ensure that
free discussion could be maintained among individuals speaking on the topic
of “government affairs.”202 Perhaps more importantly, the First Amendment
protects an individual’s right to associate politically, as acknowledged in
NAACP v. Alabama, especially when controversial viewpoints are
expressed.203

194. Id. at 787.
195. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 787.
196. Id. at 829
197. Id. at 828–29 (explaining that the signature requirements being imposed on independent
candidates became a popular method of determining whether or not a candidate had public
support prior to the holding of an election).
198. Id. at 828.
199. Id.
200. FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 172–73 (Sheila Suess
Kennedy, ed.) (1999); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 233 (2d. ed. Foundation
Press 2003).
201. See FARBER, supra note 200, at 241.
202. FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 200, at 172–73.
203. Id. at 173 (noting that when political groups assemble, different vantage points are
expressed); see FARBER, supra note 200 at 233.
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The First Amendment protects a wide range of activity, including the right
of groups to organize, though these rights are not unlimited.204 States are often
allowed a fair amount of deference concerning ballot laws, despite the
acknowledgment that the laws may impede political association.205 It has been
argued, however, that freedom of association rights are at their pinnacle when
the activity of a group deals with speech that is political in nature.206 A line
exists between the right of a state to determine how elections ought to be
controlled and the rights reserved to political organizations.207
Courts have generally held that where there is serious infringement on
ballot access, the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied is strict, though
reasonable infringements are entitled to a more deferential standard of
review.208 Courts in the past, when using strict scrutiny, have overturned state
laws that burden a party’s right to freely associate and to nominate one of its
own candidates for office.209 If the restrictions imposed on the rights of the
voter are reasonable, however, courts will often find that the state’s interest in
regulating the election is a proper reason for the restrictions.210 In Burdick v.
Takushi, the Supreme Court held a Hawaii law not allowing write-in votes for
its elections was constitutional.211 However, Hawaii law allowed for a number
of ways in which candidates were able to get on the election ballot, and thus, it
was determined that not allowing write-in candidates a spot on the ballot was
not a serious enough infringement to be unconstitutional.212
The Supreme Court in Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party made clear
that First Amendment protections for third-party candidates did not guarantee a
plethora of rights.213 There, the Court noted that simply because it was more
difficult for independent-party candidates to succeed in elections did not mean
204. FARBER, supra note 200, at 233. “[T]he First Amendment would lose much of its value
if it protected only isolated individuals but left the government a free hand to prevent organized
activity.” Id. See also Recent Cases, Constitutional Law—Third Circuit Invalidates Statute
Burdening Ballot Access on Equal Protection Grounds—Reform Party of Allegheny County v.
Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999) (en banc), 113 HARV. L. REV.
1045, 1045 (1999) (noting that courts recognize limits on the right to assembly) [hereinafter
Recent Cases].
205. Recent Cases, supra note 204, at 1045.
206. FARBER, supra note 200, at 233.
207. Id. at 239 (“The difficult problem is drawing a line between legitimate state efforts to
structure the electoral process and illegitimate intrusion on the rights of the parties.”).
208. See id. at 239–41 (collecting cases demonstrating varying degrees of deference to state
laws).
209. Recent Cases, supra note 204, at 1046 (discussing Reform Party of Allegheny County v.
Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999)); see Reform Party of
Allegheny County v. Allegheny County Dep’t of Elections, 174 F.3d 305 (3d. Cir. 1999).
210. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241.
211. Id.; see generally Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
212. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241.
213. Id.; see generally Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
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that a state had to allow third-party candidates to enter into coalitions with
major-party candidates.214 The Court upheld the ban, noting that ensuring
voter clarity during the voting process served as sufficient rationale.215 Some
believe that this ensures a degree of constitutional protections to third-party
candidates, while at the same time, assuring that the two-party system remains
present in American politics.216
5.

The Rights of States to Manage Their Elections

States have almost complete authority to engage in election regulation, and
courts have allowed states to ensure that certain interests, including the right of
voters to be informed about the electoral process as well as political stability,
are protected.217 Political parties themselves are lightly regulated, allowing
parties to engage in most activities short of violating constitutional
provisions.218 The Constitution allows states a great deal of latitude in holding
their own elections with little outside interference, and states are entitled to
regulate the “times, places, and manner of holding elections” for Congressional
races, with the only check on the state related to Congress’s ability to look over
the process.219
In Anderson, the Court noted that states have a right to ensure that those
voters who cast their ballots are informed about the electoral process.220 In
addition, Anderson added a number of other interests that the state could
consider.221 Aside from having educated voters, further interests included
ensuring a stable political environment and requiring “equal treatment for
partisan and independent candidates.”222
With regard to voter education, the Court in Anderson noted that from the
times of the Founding Fathers, there was a sentiment the President should not
be voted for directly by the American populous.223 The Court stated that it was

214. FARBER, supra note 200, at 241.
215. Id. at 241–42.
216. See generally id. at 242.
217. Nathaniel Persily, Candidates v. Parties: The Constitutional Constraints on Primary
Ballot Access Laws, 89 GEO. L.J. 2181, 2207 (2001); see Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
796 (1983).
218. Persily, supra note 217, at 2207.
219. Id. at 2207–08.
220. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796.
221. Id. at 796–97.
222. Id.; see Daybell, supra note 161, at 300–01 (noting that while the purpose behind the
procedural rights given to the states to manage their own elections was so that states could
determine how people would vote, this never entailed allowing states such a role in the process as
to determine who was going to be elected).
223. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 797 n.21 (explaining that there was early apprehension of
allowing the American people to directly elect the president, for fear that they were not intelligent
enough to perform such a duty).
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unclear whether the education of the voter continued to be a justifiable purpose
behind the early filing date imposed on independent candidates in Ohio.224
There were a number of reasons why voter education was no longer considered
a justifiable reason for restrictive ballot laws according to the Anderson
Court.225 In the first instance, by the time the Supreme Court heard Anderson,
media had changed the manner in which people were able to receive
information about candidates during elections.226 In addition, literacy was not
a skill possessed by all during the 18th century, but this was no longer the case
at the time of Anderson.227 Not only were Americans more literate, but the
Court also acknowledged that Americans were better informed about their
candidate choices for public office.228 Following the analysis in Anderson, the
Supreme Court reasoned that pronouncements by a state claiming that its
actions were performed in order to better educate its people should be looked
upon with scrutiny.229
The equal treatment of candidates was an additional interest of the Court in
Anderson, and various steps were taken to ensure the equal treatment of major
and minor-party candidates.230 The justification of Ohio in Anderson was that
the election statutes of Ohio enabled “equal treatment” between major-party
primary candidates and general election independent candidates.231 The Court
found a major distinction between candidates competing in party primaries as
opposed to candidates who were running in an election as an independent
candidate.232 The Anderson Court recognized that regardless of who ended up
running under the Democratic or Republican ticket during an election, the fact
remained that a Democrat or Republican would still have a place on the
ballot—a luxury not afforded to an independent who did not file an election
Further, while administrative purposes could be
petition in time.233

224. Id. at 797.
225. See id. (noting that changes in era can also impact the manner in which the population
considers their laws).
226. Id
227. Id.; see Cent. Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook North America: The United
States, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (explaining that
of all individuals in the United States today age fifteen and above, the literacy rate is
approximately ninety-nine percent) (last visited March 24, 2010).
228. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796–97.
229. Id. at 798.
230. Id. at 799–801.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 799 (“The consequences of failing to meet the statutory deadline are entirely
different for party primary participants and independents.”).
233. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 799. It should also be noted that the Court in Anderson
acknowledged the fact that write-in votes were permitted for independent candidates. See id. at
799 n.26. The Court also noted, however, that such action could not serve as a substitute for a
candidate actually having their name placed on a ballot. Id.
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established, requiring a major-party primary candidate to file seventy-five days
prior to a primary, the same justification did not hold true for an independent
candidate.234 Ballots needed to be prepared in an adequate amount of time,
especially for a presidential race, where the nomination of the party candidate
usually comes before the party’s convention.235 Similar justifications could not
be made for independent candidates, and there was no compelling
administrative purpose justifying why an independent candidate would be
forced to submit their petitions at such an early date.236
6.

The State of Elections Today

Legislation is a common approach used to limit the rights of independent
candidates in obtaining ballot access.237 The petitioning system is one of the
most popular tools that states use today with regard to allowing third-party
candidates to receive a place on a general election ballot.238 The general rule is
that if a political party had a candidate in a previous election who received a
pre-set number of votes (or a percentage of the vote), the party would
automatically be able to have another candidate put on the ballot in subsequent
elections.239 Because this sort of success is rare among third-party candidates,
states have requirements forcing independent candidates to obtain a certain
number of signatures to ensure a place on the ballot.240
Regardless of the number of signatures that are actually required of the
candidates, some have argued that the fact that independent party candidates
need to collect signatures at all is intended only as a mechanism to keep thirdparty candidates off the ballot.
Many states continue to use strict
requirements.241 As recently as 1994, Colorado maintained what amounted to
a residency requirement for third-party candidates.242 In order for a third-party
candidate to run for a congressional seat in Colorado, the candidate had to be
registered as an independent for a year prior to any petition submitted for a
spot on the general election ballot.243 As of 1994, no third-party candidate in
234. Id. at 800.
235. Id.
236. Id. No administrative purpose could be established regarding the early filing date set
forth by Ohio. Ohio did not prove, nor did it even set forth the notion that a March filing date
was a necessity for the state to take care of such tasks as counting votes.
237. Smith, supra note 111, at 174–75.
238. Id. at 175 (noting that all states with the exception of Mississippi have some sort of
petitioning system).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 176. The number of signatures actually required by different states varies
drastically, and during the 1990 election, New Jersey required as few as 200 signatures for a spot
in the general election, whereas Florida required over 180,000. See id.
241. Id. at 176; Winger, supra note 3.
242. Winger, supra note 3.
243. Id.
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Georgia had been able to make the ballot while running for the United States
House of Representatives due to the state’s strict petitioning requirements.244
Illinois continues to have both stringent and disproportionate signature
requirements as they relate to the major party and independent party
candidates.245 For example, in Illinois, major party candidates for governor
only need to obtain 5000 signatures for a place on the ballot.246 Independent
candidates for governor need 25,000 signatures.247 The issue for this Note
becomes whether the various impositions on individuals seeking a spot on an
election ballot are too stringent, and whether the laws should be relaxed so that
minor-party candidates have a greater chance of being able to run for elected
office.248
IV. WHERE MAINE ELECTION LAW FALLS SHORT
A number of Maine’s election laws pose an unnecessary burden to a thirdparty candidate’s ability to have his or her name placed on general election
ballots, and as such, should be declared a violation of both voter’s and
candidate’s First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.249 While it can be argued
that the petition requirements under Maine law may be applied equally to both
major-party and independent-party candidates, the law simply does not
mandate such equal application.250
The provisions of Maine’s election law that precluded Herbert Hoffman
from a spot on the ballot violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they
impose a burden on third-party candidates, going beyond the protection that
courts in the past have recognized as constituting permissible state interests.251
Such an argument was raised by the challengers of a Georgia election law in

244. Id.
245. Freeandequal.org, Third Party Activists on Illinois HB 723: “The Protect Incumbents
Act,” http://www.freeandequal.org/2009/08/third-party-activists-on-illinois-hb-723-the-protectincumbents-act/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
246. Id.; see also Winger, supra note 3.
247. Third Party Activists, supra note 245; Winger, supra note 3.
248. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 26–27 (1968); see Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of
State and Herbert Hoffman, 954 A.2d 1054, 1057; Winger, supra note 3.
249. U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–
18.
250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
354(9); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796–99 (1983) (acknowledging the difference in
treatment between major and independent party candidates).
251. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9);
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31; see Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060–61.
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Jenness, where the argument was that the signature requirements imposed an
improper burden to freedom of association rights.252
Independent candidates are placed under constraints that major-party
candidates simply do not have to contend with.253 Such constraints weigh no
differently on third-party candidates in Maine than in many other states.254
Maine law draws distinctions between those candidates representing major
political parties and those candidates running as independents, requiring a
greater effort from third-party candidates for their name to appear on the
ballot.255 Not only does the petition signature requirement constitute an
infringement on equal protection rights in and of itself by making it difficult
for third-party candidates to obtain a place on the ballot; other Maine laws
enhance the difficulty by imposing requirements that are overly strict in their
application.256
Together with Maine’s petition requirement, the signature collection
process has infringed the First Amendment rights of both Maine’s voters and
its third-party candidates.257 The Court in Williams noted that the reasons for
imposing excessive burdens on independent-party candidates by using early
filing dates could not be upheld as promoting any legitimate interest of the
state.258 In the Hoffman case, a major point of contention was whether the
physical presence requirements had been met by Hoffman while he was
collecting signatures for his general election run.259 These requirements
constitute an undue burden on the abilities of third-party candidates to obtain
enough signatures to receive a place on federal election ballots.260 What the
Maine statute does is require candidates running for office to acquire a great
number of petition signatures simply to be eligible to have their name placed
on the ballot.261 Not only does the law require the collection of a large number
of signatures, but it also requires that the signer of the petition do so while in

252. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9);
Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; Williams, 393 U.S. at 31; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434
(1971); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1060–61.
253. See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 796–99.
254. See id.; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–18; Smith, supra note
111, at 174–77.
255. Kristin Sullivan, Requirements for Petitioning Candidates under Public Financing,
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006-R-0162.htm.
256. Id.; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Williams, 393 U.S. at 27.
257. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 14–18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21-A, § 354(7)(A); Williams, 393 U.S. at 31–32.
258. Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.
259. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
354(7)(A).
260. Id.; Williams, 393 U.S. at 29.
261. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354.
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the physical presence of the petition circulator.262 Therefore, the task of
actually accumulating the required number of signatures becomes more
difficult.263 The major political parties do not have to contend with this
situation,264 and thus, a distinction is drawn between major-party candidates
and third-party candidates.265
Using the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Anderson, such a distinction
violates the Fourteenth Amendment.266 The Court in that case noted that equal
protection is violated where major-party candidates have different
Under Maine law,
requirements than independent-party candidates.267
however, not only are major candidates freed from having to collect signatures,
but they are also free from the overly stringent “physical presence”
requirements required under Maine state law.268 This requirement seems to be
an additional qualification for independent candidates, which goes against the
Court’s decision in Thornton.269
The Anderson Court also reasoned that by not allowing a candidate a place
on a ballot, the rights of the voter were also violated.270 The Court took notice
of the fact that, by having only major-party candidates on an election ballot,
there was a chance that some voters would be unable to select candidates who
share their political ideology.271 As such, the balancing test of Anderson
renders the decision of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court overturning the
findings of the Secretary of State questionable.272 In considering the
“character and magnitude” of the injury to a Maine voter’s First Amendment
rights, it hardly seems appropriate that the rules requiring the physical presence
of the petitioner ought to be upheld.273 What needs to be considered is whether

262. Id.; see also Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6.
263. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
21-A, § 354 (2007).
264. Shannon Jones, Maine: SEP Campaign Faced Arcane Ballot Requirements, Private
Property Restrictions, June 2, 2004, http://www.wsws.org/articles/2004/jun2004/mne2-j02.shtml
(last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
265. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 799–801
(1983); Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18.
266. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783; see Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6,
14–18.
267. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 783, 786–88.
268. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Jones, supra note 264.
269. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354; Jones, supra note 264; see also Thornton, 514
U.S. at 837–838.
270. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–88; see also Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974).
271. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786–88.
272. Id. at 789; Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State and Herbert Hoffman, 2008 ME 124, ¶¶
16–21, 954 A.2d 1054, 1060–61; see also Daybell, supra note 161, at 310.
273. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7) (2007); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
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these provisions of Maine election law serve any justifiable purpose, deserving
of the serious burden imposed on voter’s rights.274
Because the right to associate politically is of such importance, and
because differing or controversial viewpoints are essential to the political
process, what Maine law has done is render worthless the opinion of voters
whose political views are different than those of the major-party candidates.275
The Court in Anderson noted that the First Amendment is violated if
independent candidates are burdened to a greater extent or in a manner
inconsistent with major political parties regarding the right to properly
associate.276 Those voters who legitimately signed Herbert Hoffman’s petition
during the petition signing process have therefore been deprived of their
rights.277 These were people who legally signed the petitions in accordance
with the requirements under Maine law, and by depriving them of their rights
in having their votes counted, they are effectively deprived of their First
Amendment rights under the United States Constitution.278 Even more
problematic in Hoffman was the fact that the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
failed to pay adequate attention to the First Amendment concerns in the first
place.279
It was fully acknowledged during the Hoffman case hearings that
signatures were taken outside of Hoffman’s presence as he circulated
petitions.280 As an initial matter, the requirement that signatures be gathered in
the presence of the circulator creates an undue burden on the candidate.281 The
requirement creates a situation where a candidate is unable to have people
collect signatures on their behalf while the candidate is engaged in other
activity, and if the candidate is the individual who is circulating the petition, he
or she is responsible for personally witnessing every signature placed on that
petition.282

274. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7); Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789; see also Nazzarine,
supra note 182, at 319.
275. FREE EXPRESSION IN AMERICA, supra note 200, at 172–73; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 21-A, § 354(7); see Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State and Herbert Hoffman (Knutson II),
2008 ME 129, ¶ 7, No. Ken-08-375, 2008 WL 3855025 (Me.) at *2 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Aug. 20,
2008).
276. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 793–94.
277. See Knutson II, 2008 ME 129, ¶ 7, No. Ken-08-375, 2008 WL 3855025 (Me.) at *2
(Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. Aug. 20, 2008).
278. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007).
279. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3.
280. Id. at 7–8.
281. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 27–32
(1968); Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–18.
282. Williams, 393 U.S. at 27–32; Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 6, 14–
18; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354.
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This disadvantage became evident when Hoffman was ultimately denied a
place on the general election ballot and was forced to attempt to win the Maine
United States Senate seat through a write-in campaign.283 Appearing as a
write-in candidate is not sufficient in remedying the violations incurred by
Hoffman.284 Voters knew of Hoffman, and therefore voted for him in the
general election, while aware that Hoffman had almost no chance of defeating
incumbent Susan Collins.285 What people found when they finally looked at
the Secretary of State’s website for the vote tally, however, was that many of
the votes for Hoffman had not been counted.286 Individuals from a number of
towns alleged that they had voted for Hoffman by writing his name in under
the “other” category, though the end tally for a number of these towns counted
zero votes for Hoffman.287 Of specific concern was the fact that no votes for
Hoffman were counted in Franklin County, where a university is located.288 It
should also be noted that Herbert Hoffman was not the only write-in candidate
to appear on the ballot, meaning that municipalities that counted zero votes for
candidates in the “other” category did not count votes for any of the other
Senate candidates running as write-in contenders.289
What towns like Limerick, Maine contended with was voter
disenfranchisement through human error.290 Of the five votes cast for write-in
candidates in that town, not one vote actually made it to the final tally.291
Could one definitively say that this would not have happened if those
candidates (presumably including Herbert Hoffman) had been allowed to have
their name printed on the general ballot? It is unlikely that any definitive
conclusion can be reached.292 But it is hardly arguable that had Hoffman’s
name actually appeared on the ballot, such errors would have been less likely
to occur, and those voters actually voting for Hoffman would have had a better
chance of having their votes counted.293
One of the problems encountered in the town of Limerick was that the list
of pre-notarized and affirmed candidates for the write-in campaign never made
it to the town.294 As a result, any vote for a write-in candidate could not be
283. Bill Nemitz, Write-in Senate Votes Don’t Add Up, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 16,
2008, at B1.
284. Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 12–13.
285. Bill Nemitz, Write-in Senate Votes Don’t Add Up, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Dec. 16,
2008, at B1.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Nemitz, supra note 285.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
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counted in Limerick.295 Despite the fact that Secretary of State Matthew
Dunlap has plans for avoiding such results in the future, this fails to remedy the
effects of an election where a candidate was unable to garner votes in certain
state municipalities.296
CONCLUSION
The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in the Hoffman case sets
dangerous precedent for election law.297 Should literal statutory interpretations
continue to be upheld over the legitimate interests of independent party
candidates asserting their constitutional rights, the result will be a two-party
system where voters continue to suffer the effects of disenfranchisement.298
Election law in Maine seeks to protect the interests of the state in ensuring
that the nomination process is valid.299 While states have a legitimate interest
in maintaining control and order over their election process, questions arise
when laws hinder the interests of large groups of the voting population.300 In
parts of Maine, it was clear that Hoffman’s exclusion from the ballot served to
disenfranchise a number of people who attempted to vote for him.301 Voters
who attempted to cast votes for Hoffman were otherwise unable to, as write-in
votes in some towns were never actually counted.302
The question must be posed: Are Maine’s election requirements justified
under strict scrutiny in light of the fact that they have disenfranchised
voters?303 The Maine Supreme Court failed to address the First Amendment
issue, an issue that may have served to complicate the rather straightforward
decision that the court seemed to reach.304 By looking at the language of the
statute, it appears as though the decision of the court was fair.305 It appears
that Hoffman took an improper oath because he was not present to witness

295. Nemitz, supra note 285.
296. Id.
297. See Knutson v. Dep’t of Sec’y of State and Herbert Hoffman, 2008 ME 124, ¶¶ 24–25,
954 A.2d 1054, 1061–62 (where the court used the literal interpretation of the statute, justifying it
on the grounds that the validity of the nomination process would be upheld).
298. Id.; see FARBER, supra note 200, at 233; see also Emergency Application for a Stay,
supra note 10, at 2–3.
299. Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62.
300. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 798–99; Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 783–84 (1983);
see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 27–32 (1968); see Emergency Application for a Stay, supra
note 10, at 2; see also Bill Nemitz, Write-in Senate Votes Don’t Add Up, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD, Dec. 16, 2008, at B1.
301. Nemitz, supra note 285.
302. Id.
303. Id.; see ME. REV.STAT. ANN tit. 21-A, § 354 (2007).
304. See Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 3; see also FARBER, supra note
200, at 233–39.
305. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1062.
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every signature put on his petition.306 But the issue is not about whether or not
Hoffman was right or wrong in this case; it is about the state of the law and its
potential to improperly deprive voters of their constitutional rights.307 The
Maine Supreme Judicial Court looked only at the application of the law as it
pertained to the immediate case at hand rather than the larger implications of
its decision.308
The Maine legislature must address the issue at hand and should begin to
consider the intent of those individuals forced to acquire signatures to support
their candidacy when they engage in the petition process.309 If the signature
collection process is done in good faith, there seems to be little interest for the
state in maintaining overly strict requirements for candidates, especially when
considering more serious constitutional concerns.310 The law as it stands today
serves as a technical barrier to candidates who might in good faith have tried to
comply with the requirements of the law but for some reason failed to do so.311
In light of First and Fourteenth Amendment concerns, technicalities in the
Maine statutes cannot reasonably stand in the way of the ability to run for
political office.312
POSTSCRIPT
On June 4, 2009, Governor Baldacci of Maine signed into law a bill
designed to increase fairness among third-party candidates running for elected
office in the State of Maine.313 In addition, the Maine legislature has taken
action with respect to some details of its election law in order to clarify
whether or not an entire petition should be thrown out for improperly collected

306. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); see also Knutson I, 954 A.2d at
1057; see generally Emergency Application for a Stay, supra note 10, at 2.
307. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62; see also FARBER, supra
note 200, at 233–34.
308. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A) (2007); see Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1062;
see Nemitz, supra note 285; see also FARBER, supra note 200, at 233–34.
309. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); see Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62
(noting that where the intent of the candidate is to commit fraud, the petitions will be invalidated,
though fraud is not required for invalidation).
310. U.S. CONST. amend. I; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 434
(1971); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62.
311. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); Knutson I, 954 A.2d at 1061–62 (where the
Maine Supreme Court determined that it would use literal interpretations of the statute).
312. U.S. CONST. amend. I; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(7)(A); see Knutson I, 954
A.2d at 1061–62; see also FARBER, supra note 200 at 241; Daybell, supra note 161, at 313–14.
313. Former Independent Candidate Helps Influence Maine Election Laws, Independent
Political Report, June 17, 2009, http://www.independentpoliticalreport.com/2009/06/formerindependent-candidate-helps-influence-maine-election-laws/ (last visited Feb. 15 2010).
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signatures on the petition.314 The law now states that should a signature on a
petition be improperly collected, only those signatures, rather than the petition
as a whole, will be eliminated.315 While this is certainly a step in the right
direction, the law does not change the strict physical presence requirements for
candidates. 316 In fact, the new law simply clarifies what is meant by “physical
presence,” and petition circulators are still required to swear an oath that all
signatures on a petition were “personally witnessed.”317 Therefore, while
attempts are being made to ensure a fairer route for the election of third party
candidates in Maine, there are still a number of challenges facing independent
candidates today, and the Maine legislature should continue its active efforts to
ensure that future changes are made to improve Maine’s election laws.
DAVID W. MORIN

314. Independent Political Report, supra note 313; see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §
354(9) (2009); see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9) (2007).
315. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 354(9); 2009 Me. Laws 792; Independent Political
Report, supra note 313.
316. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A § 354(9).
317. 2009 Me. Laws 792.
 J.D., Saint Louis University School of Law, 2009; B.A., The Catholic University of America,
2006. I want to thank the members of the Saint Louis University Law Journal for their diligent
work on this casenote. I also wish to thank Megan Sanders, an attorney in Portland, Maine, for
bringing the topic of this casenote to my attention.
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